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Abstract
This paper presents a new analysis of C.G. Hempel’s conditions of ad-
equacy for any relation of confirmation (Hempel 1945), differing from the
one Carnap gave in §87 of his (1962). Hempel, it is argued, felt the need for
two concepts of confirmation: one aiming at true hypotheses and another
aiming at informative hypotheses. However, he also realized that these two
concepts are conflicting, and he gave up the concept of confirmation aiming
at informative hypotheses. I then show that one can have Hempel’s cake
and eat it too. There is a logic that takes into account both of these two
conflicting aspects. According to this logic, a sentence H is an acceptable
hypothesis for evidence E if and only if H is both sufficiently plausible
given E and sufficiently informative about E. Finally, the logic sheds new
light on Carnap’s analysis.*
* I am grateful to Peter Brössel for comments on an earlier version of this paper.
My research was supported by the Ahmanson Foundation as well as by the Alexander von
Humboldt Foundation, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research, and the Program for the
Investment in the Future (ZIP) of the German Government through a Sofja Kovalevskaja Award,
while I was a member of the Philosophy, Probability, and Modeling group at the Center for Junior
Research Fellows at the University of Konstanz.
2
1 Hempel’s Conditions of Adequacy
In his “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation” (1945) Carl G. Hempel presented
the following conditions of adequacy for any relation of confirmation (names for
3.1 and 3.2 added). For any sentence (observation report) E and any sentences
(hypotheses) H,H ′:
1. Entailment Condition
If E logically implies H , then E confirms H .
2. Consequence Condition
If the set of all hypotheses confirmed by E, HE , logically implies H , then
E confirms H .
2.1 Special Consequence Condition
If E confirms H and H logically implies H ′, then E confirms H ′.
2.2 Equivalence Condition
If E confirms H and H ′ is logically equivalent to H , then E confirms
H ′.
3. Consistency Condition
E is compatible with the setHE of all hypotheses it confirms.
3.1 Special Consistency Condition
If E is consistent and confirms H , and if H logically implies ¬H ′,
then E does not confirm H ′.
3.2 Consistent Selectivity
If E is consistent and confirms H , then E does not confirm ¬H .
4. Converse Consequence Condition
If E confirms H and H ′ logically implies H , then E confirms H ′.
Condition 2 entails condition 2.1, which in turn entails condition 2.2; similarly
in case of 3. Hempel then showed (Hempel 1945: 104) that the conjunction of
1, 2, and 4 entails his triviality result that every sentence (observation report) E
confirms every sentence (hypothesis) H . This is clear since the conjunction of 1
and 4 already implies this. By the Entailment Condition, E confirms E ∨H . As
H logically implies E ∨ H , the Converse Consequence Condition yields that E
confirms H , for any sentences E and H .
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Since Hempel’s negative result, there has hardly been any progress in devel-
oping a logic of confirmation.1 One reason for this seems to be that up to now
the predominant view on Hempel’s conditions is the analysis Carnap gave in his
Logical Foundations of Probability (1962), §87.
2 Carnap’s Analysis of Hempel’s Conditions
In analyzing the Consequence Condition, Carnap argues that
Hempel has in mind as explicandum the following relation: ‘the de-
gree of confirmation of H by E is greater than r’, where r is a fixed
value, perhaps 0 or 1/2. (Carnap 1962: 475; notation adapted)
In discussing the Consistency Condition, Carnap mentions that
Hempel himself shows that a set of physical measurements may con-
firm several quantitative hypotheses which are incompatible with each
other (p. 106). This seems to me a clear refutation of [3.1]. ... What
may be the reasons that have led Hempel to the consistency conditions
[3.1] and [3]? He regards it as a great advantage of any explicatum
satisfying [3] “that is sets a limit, so to speak, to the strength of the
hypotheses which can be confirmed by given evidence” ... This ar-
gument does not seem to have any plausibility for our explicandum,
(Carnap 1962: 476-7; emphasis in original)
which is the classificatory or qualitative concept of (initially) confirming evidence,
as Carnap says in §86 of his (1962), that he explicates in terms of positive proba-
bilistic relevance.
But it is plausible for the second explicandum mentioned earlier: the
degree of confirmation exceeding a fixed value r. Therefore we may
perhaps assume that Hempel’s acceptance of the consistency condi-
tion is due again to an inadvertant shift to the second explicandum.
(Carnap 1962: 477-8)
1The exceptions I know of are Flach (2000), Milne (2000), and Zwirn & Zwirn (1996).
Roughly, Zwirn & Zwirn (1996) argue that there is no unified logic of confirmation (taking into
account all of the partly conflicting aspects of confirmation). Flach (2000) argues that there are
two logics of “induction”, as he calls it, viz. confirmatory and explicatory induction (correspond-
ing to Hempel’s conditions 1-3 and 4, respectively). Milne (2000) argues that there is a logic of
confirmation – namely the logic of positive probabilistic relevance – but that it does not deserve to
be called a logic.
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Carnap’s analysis can be summarized as follows. In presenting his first three con-
ditions of adequacy Hempel was mixing up two distinct concepts of confirmation,
two distinct explicanda in Carnap’s terminology. These are
1. the concept of (initially) confirming evidence: Carnap explicates this con-
cept by incremental confirmation or positive probabilistic relevance accord-
ing to which E confirms H if and only if E (has non-zero probability and)
increases the probability of H , i.e. Pr (H | E) > Pr (H), and
2. the concept of the degree of confirmation exceeding a fixed value r: Carnap
explicates this concept by absolute confirmation according to which E con-
firms H if and only if the probability of H given E, Pr (H | E), is greater
than some value r.
The special versions of Hempel’s second and third condition, 2.1 and 3.1, respec-
tively, hold true for the second explicatum (for r ≥ .5). However, they do not
hold true for the first explicatum. On the other hand, Hempel’s first condition
holds true for the first explicatum, but it does so only in a qualified form (Carnap
1962: 473) – namely only if E is not assigned probability 0, and H is not already
assigned probability 1.
This means that, according to Carnap’s analysis, Hempel first had in mind
the explicandum of (initially) confirming evidence for the Entailment Condition.
Then he had in mind the explicandum of the degree of confirmation exceeding
a fixed value r for the Special Consequence and the Special Consistency Con-
ditions 2.1 and 3.1, respectively. Finally, when Hempel presented the Converse
Consequence Condition, he got completely confused and had in mind still another
explicandum or concept of confirmation.2 Apart from not being very charitable,
Carnap’s reading of Hempel also leaves open the question what the third expli-
candum might have been.
3 Conflicting Concepts of Confirmation
The following two notions are central to the plausibility-informativeness theory
(Huber 2007a). A relation of confirmation is an informativeness relation if and
only if the following holds:
If E confirms H and H ′ logically implies H , then E confirms H ′.
A relation of confirmation is a plausibility relation if and only if the following
2Neither the first nor the second explicatum satisfies the Converse Consequence Condition.
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holds:
If E confirms H and H logically implies H ′, then E confirms H ′.
The idea is that a sentence or proposition is the more informative, the more possi-
bilities it excludes. Hence, the logically stronger a sentence, the more informative
it is. On the other hand, a sentence is more plausible the fewer possibilities it
excludes, i.e. the more possibilities it includes. Hence, the logically weaker a
sentence, the more plausible it is. The qualitative counterparts of these two com-
parative principles are the defining clauses above. If H is informative relative
to E, then so is any logically stronger sentence H ′. Similarly, if H is plausible
relative to E, then so is any logically weaker sentence H ′.
The two main approaches to confirmation that have been put forth in the last
century are qualitative Hypothetico-Deductivism HD and quantitative probabilis-
tic Inductive Logic IL. According to HD, E HD-confirms H if and only if H
logically implies E (in some suitable way that depends on the version of HD un-
der consideration). According to IL, the degree of absolute confirmation of H by
E equals the (logical) probability ofH givenE, i.e. Pr (H | E). The natural qual-
itative counterpart of this quantitative notion is that E (absolutely) IL-confirms H
if and only if the probability of H given E is greater than some value r in [.5, 1),
i.e. Pr (H | E) > r (this is Carnap’s second explicatum).
As noted above, this is not the way Carnap defines qualitative IL-confirmation
in chapter VII of his (1962). There he requires that E raise the probability of H ,
Pr (H | E) > Pr (H), in order for E to qualitatively IL-confirm H . Nevertheless,
the above is the natural qualitative counterpart of the degree of absolute confirma-
tion. The reason is that later on, the difference between Pr (H | E) and Pr (H) –
however it is measured (Fitelson 1999) – was taken as the degree of incremental
confirmation. Carnap’s proposal is the natural qualitative counterpart of this no-
tion of incremental confirmation. In order to distinguish these two notions, let us
say that E incrementally confirms H if and only if Pr (H | E) > Pr (H).
HD and IL are based on two conflicting concepts of confirmation. HD-confirmation
increases, whereas (absolute) IL-confirmation decreases with the logical strength
of the hypothesis to be assessed. More precisely, ifE HD-confirmsH andH ′ logi-
cally impliesH , thenE HD-confirmsH ′. So, as a matter of fact, HD-confirmation
aims at logically strong hypotheses – HD-confirmation is an informativeness rela-
tion. On the other hand, if E absolutely IL-confirms H (to some degree r) and H
logically implies H ′, then E absolutely IL-confirms H ′ (to at least the same de-
gree s ≥ r). Hence, as a matter of fact, absolute IL-confirmation aims at logically
weak hypotheses – absolute IL-confirmation is a plausibility relation.
The epistemic virtues behind these two concepts are informativeness on the
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one hand and truth or plausibility on the other hand. We want to know what is
going on “out there”, and hence we aim at true hypotheses – more precisely, at
hypotheses that are true in the world we are in. We also want to know as much as
possible about what is going on out there, and so we aim at informative hypotheses
– more precisely, at hypotheses that inform us about the world we are in. But
usually we do not know which world we are in. All we have are some data. So we
base our evaluation of the hypothesis we are concerned with on the plausibility
that the hypothesis is true in the actual world given that the actual world makes
the data true and on how much the hypothesis informs us about the actual world
given that the actual world makes the data true.
If one of two hypotheses logically implies the other, the logically stronger
hypothesis excludes all the possibilities excluded by the logically weaker one. The
logically stronger hypothesis is thus at least as informative as the logically weaker
one. On the other hand, the logically weaker hypothesis is at least as plausible as
the logically stronger one. The reason is that all possibilities making the logically
stronger hypothesis true also make the logically weaker one true. This is the sense
in which the two concepts underlying HD and IL, respectively, are conflicting.
4 Hempel Vindicated
Turning back to Hempel’s conditions, note first that Carnap’s second explicatum
satisfies the Entailment Condition without the second qualification: if E logically
impliesH , then Pr (H | E) = 1 > r, for any value r in [0, 1). This holds provided
E does not have probability 0 (this proviso can be dropped by using appropriate
alternatives to classical probability measures).
So the following more charitable reading of Hempel seems plausible. When
presenting his first three conditions, Hempel had in mind Carnap’s second expli-
candum, the concept of the degree of confirmation exceeding a fixed value r, or
more generally, a plausibility relation. In fact, what Hempel actually seemed to
have in mind is the explicandum underlying the satisfaction criterion of confirma-
tion (Hempel 1945: 107-112, esp. 109, and Hempel 1943), which is a plausibility
relation satisfying these three conditions. But then, when discussing the Con-
verse Consequence Condition, Hempel also felt the need for a second concept of
confirmation aiming at informative hypotheses – explicated, it seems, in terms of
the prediction-criterion of confirmation (Hempel 1945: 97-102, esp. 98) and its
“quantitative counterpart”, the concept of systemic power (Hempel & Oppenheim
1948: 164-173; 168, fn. 35, for the quote).
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Given that it was the Converse Consequence Condition that Hempel gave up
in his “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation”, the present analysis makes perfect
sense of his reasoning. Though he felt the need for two concepts of confirmation,
Hempel also realized that these two concepts are conflicting – this is the content
of his triviality result. Consequently he abandoned informativeness in favor of
plausibility.
Let us check this by going through Hempel’s conditions. Hempel’s Entail-
ment Condition is that E confirms H if E logically implies H . In this case, the
plausibility of H given E is maximal, because the data guarantee the truth of the
hypothesis. On the other hand, if E entails H , H need not inform us about E.
The Consequence Condition says that if E confirms a set of hypotheses H,
then E confirms every consequence H ofH. This condition clearly does not hold
of the informativeness concept. It holds without qualification for the plausibility
concept only in its restricted form 2.1, the Special Consequence Condition (this is
also noted by Carnap 1962: 474-6). The latter condition expresses that plausibility
decreases with the logical strength of the hypothesis to be assessed. In particular,
if the probability of H given E is greater than some value r ≥ .5, then so is the
probability of any logical consequence H ′ of H .
The Consistency Condition says that every consistentE is compatible with the
setHE of all hypotheses E confirms. As before, this condition does not hold true
of the informativeness concept. It holds true for the plausibility concept only with
a proviso and only in its restricted form 3.1, the Special Consistency Condition: if
E is consistent and confirms H , then E confirms no H ′ which is not compatible
with H . In this case, H ′ logically implies ¬H , whence the plausibility of H ′ is not
greater than that of ¬H (plausibility decreases with logical strength). Given the
proviso that no consistentE confirms both a hypothesis and its negation, the result
follows. As noted by Carnap (1962: 478), this proviso is satisfied if plausibility is
measured by a probability measure and r ≥ .5: if the probability of hypothesis H
given evidence E is high (> 1/2), then the probability of any hypothesis H ′ given
E, where H ′ is not compatible with H , must be low (< 1/2). The reason is that
the sum of these two probabilities cannot exceed 1.
The culprit, according to Hempel (1945: 103-7, esp. 104-5), is the Con-
verse Consequence Condition: if E confirms H and H is logically implied by
H ′, then E confirms H ′. Clearly, this condition holds for informativeness, but
not for plausibility. In fact, it coincides with the defining clause of informative-
ness relations by expressing the requirement that informativeness increases with
the logical strength of the hypothesis to be assessed. The Converse Consequence
Condition is satisfied by HD-confirmation and, more importantly, by Hempel’s
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prediction-criterion of confirmation, which is a qualitative version of his measure
of systematic power.
5 The Logic of Hypothesis Assessment
However, in a sense, one can have Hempel’s cake and eat it too. There is a logic of
confirmation – or rather, hypothesis assessment – that takes into account both of
these two conflicting concepts. Roughly speaking, HD says that a good hypothesis
is informative, whereas IL says that a good hypothesis is plausible or true. The
driving force behind Hempel’s conditions is the insight that a good hypothesis is
both true and informative. Hence, in assessing a given hypothesis by the available
data, one should account for these two conflicting aspects.
According to the logic of hypothesis assessment, a sentence or proposition H
is an acceptable hypothesis for evidence E if and only if H is at least as plausible
as and more informative than its negation relative to E, or H is more plausible
than and at least as informative as its negation relative to E.
In order to formalize this notion of acceptability we have to employ some for-
mal tool. Given that Carnap formulated his account in terms of probabilities, it is
convenient (for reasons of comparability) to follow him in this respect. However,
it is to be noted that one need not be committed to the probabilistic framework
in order to spell out the present account. Indeed, the proper logic with axiomati-
zation, semantics, soundness, and completeness as presented in Huber (2007b) is
formalized in terms of ranking functions (Spohn 1988, Huber 2006).
So assume a language L, i.e. a set of well-formed formulas closed under nega-
tion and conjunction, and a probability measure on L, i.e. a real-valued function
Pr on L that is non-negative, normalized, and finitely additive (i.e. such that for
any sentences H and H ′ in L: Pr (H) ≥ 0; Pr (H) = 1 if H is logically valid;
and Pr (H ∨H ′) = Pr (H) + Pr (H ′) whenever H and H ′ are not compatible).
The conditional probability of H given E, Pr (H | E), is defined as the fraction
Pr (H ∧ E) /Pr (E) whenever the probability of E is non-zero.
Given such a probability measure Pr on L, we say for any sentences H , H ′,
and E in L that H is at least as plausible as H ′ given E (in the sense of Pr) if
and only if the probability of H given E is at least as great as the probability of
H ′ given E, i.e. Pr (H | E) ≥ Pr (H ′ | E), provided the probability of E is non-
zero. If the probability of E equals 0, the relation is not defined, though we could
equally well stipulate that in this case H is at least as plausible as H ′ given E.
Furthermore we say that H informs us at least as much about E as does H ′ if
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and only if the probability of ¬H given ¬E is at least as great as the probability
of ¬H ′ given ¬E, i.e. Pr (¬H | ¬E) ≥ Pr (¬H ′ | ¬E), provided the probability
of ¬E is non-zero. As before, this relation is not defined if the probability of ¬E
equals 0, though we could equally well stipulate that in this case any H informs
us at least as much about E as any H ′. Pr (¬H | ¬E) is Hempel’s generalized
measure of systematic power s (Hempel & Oppenheim 1948: 164-173, esp. 172).
Finally, we say that H is at least as informative as H ′ (independently of E)
if and only if the probability of ¬H is at least as great as the probability of ¬H ′,
i.e. Pr (¬H) ≥ Pr (¬H ′). Pr (¬H) is Hempel’s content measure g (Hempel
& Oppenheim 1948: 164-173, esp. 171-172), in terms of which he defines s as
s (H,E) = g (H ∨ E) /g (E).
On an epistemic interpretation of probability (whether subjective or logical
does not matter), the first definition hardly needs any discussion. As to the second
definition, the idea is that Pr (¬H | ¬E) reflects how much H informs us about
E. Consider the following figure with hypothesis H and evidence E (B is the
background information), all conceived of as propositions (sets of possibilities).
B
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%%
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E
Suppose you are given E and then asked to strengthen the proposition H by
deleting possibilities verifying it, that is, by shrinking the area representing H .
Would you not delete possibilities outside E? After all, given E, those are exactly
the possibilities known not to be the actual one, whereas the possibilities inside
E are still live options. This is exactly what is captured by Pr (¬H | ¬E), and
hence it increases when H shrinks to H ′ as depicted below. For an axiomatic
justification see Hilpinen (1970).
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A consequence of adopting Pr (¬H | ¬E) as one’s measure of informative-
ness about the data is that any two hypotheses that logically imply the data are
equally – indeed, maximally – informative about the data. In order to avoid
this one can consider the data-independent informativeness of H , measured by
Pr (¬H). For Pr (¬H), it does not matter whether one deletes possibilities in-
side or outside E (provided they have equal weight on Pr). The third option of
considering how much the information in H goes beyond that provided by E,
measured by Pr (¬H | E) and considered, for instance, by Carnap & Bar-Hillel
(1952), requires one to delete the possibilities inside E. It is inadequate in the
present context (which does not mean that it is not adequate in other contexts).
Although the logic will be different when based on the one or the other notion
of informativeness, for the present purposes it does not matter which notion we
take. In fact, it suffices if we base the comparison on any weighted mixture of
Pr (¬H | ¬E) and Pr (¬H) (indeed, any function of the two will do which is
non-decreasing in both arguments and increasing in at least one). In sum, for any
language L and any probability measure Pr on L, we say that H is an acceptable
hypothesis for E in the weakly/strongly data-dependent sense (or any other sense
in between), E |∼Pr H and E |≈Pr H , respectively, if and only if H is at least
as plausible given E as its negation and H is more informative (about E) than
its negation, or H is more plausible given E than its negation and at least as
informative (about E) as its negation. That is,
Pr (H | E) ≥ Pr (¬H | E) & Pr (¬H) > Pr (H) , or
Pr (H | E) > Pr (¬H | E) & Pr (¬H) ≥ Pr (H)
and
Pr (H | E) ≥ Pr (¬H | E) & Pr (¬H | ¬E) > Pr (H | ¬E) , or
Pr (H | E) > Pr (¬H | E) & Pr (¬H | ¬E) ≥ Pr (H | ¬E) ,
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respectively. |∼Pr and |≈Pr are the weakly/strongly data-dependent assessment
relations induced by the probability measure Pr on the language L.
Logical relations, such as consequence relations or relations like the two just
mentioned, are usually characterised both semantically (as above) and syntacti-
cally by a list of axioms and rules that characterize the relation completely, rela-
tive to the semantic characterisation. This is done in Huber (2007b) for the rank-
theoretic version of strongly data-dependent assessment relations.
Another way of combining plausibility and informativeness is to consider the
expected informativeness of hypothesis H in relation to evidence E and back-
ground information B. In this case we have to think of the informativeness of H
(in relation to E and B) as a random variable I that takes on one value, say i+, if
H is true, and another value, say i−, if H is false. These two values i+ and i− of
the random variable I are then weighted by the probabilities (given E and B) that
H is true and false, respectively. This idea is pursued by Hempel (1960), Hintikka
& Pietarinen (1966), and Levi (1961; 1963; 1967). I discuss these approaches in
Huber (2007a).
6 Carnap’s Analysis Revisited
In conclusion, let us turn back to Carnap’s analysis of Hempel’s conditions and
his claim that Hempel was mixing up the explicanda underlying absolute and in-
cremental confirmation. As argued in the previous sections, Carnap’s analysis is
neither charitable nor illuminating, and there is a more charitable interpretation
that is illuminating by accounting for Hempel’s triviality result and his rejection
of the Converse Consequence Condition. Still, one might be interested in the rela-
tion between Carnap’s favored concept of qualitative confirmation – viz. positive
probabilistic relevance in the sense of a regular probability measure Pr – and our
assessment relations leading to sufficiently plausible and sufficiently informative
hypotheses.
Given the same probabilistic framework, it is clear that positive relevance of E
for H is a necessary condition for H to be an acceptable hypothesis for E. More
precisely, we have for any probability measure Pr3, and any sentences H and E:
E |∼Pr H or E |≈Pr H ⇒ Pr (H | E) > Pr (H) .
3The same holds true for any ranking function and the corresponding notion of positive rank-
theoretic relevance.
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However, the converse is not true. Both probabilistic and rank-theoretic positive
relevance are symmetric, whereas assessment relations are not.
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